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Banks are important financial intermediaries of any national economy, and corporate 
governance has an important role in banking sector; especially due to processes of the 
globalization and the internationalization, and also because of the sensitivity of the activities 
between the interest groups. The objective of this paper is to examine the relationship between 
ownership structure, concentration, owners’ type and bank performance. The authors made a 
research of banks' ownership structure using publicly available data. Using statistical tools 
authors discovered relationships between bank ownership structure and bank performance 
indicators (average asset, total asset, average equity, profit (loss) before taxes, profit (loss) 
after taxes, ROAA, ROAE). Further they discuss the relationships between ownership 
structure and a number of consequences for the bank performance. The authors discovered 
significant correlation between bank ownership structure and performance indicators variables 
that are described in the paper.    
Keywords: corporate governance, ownership structure, performance indicators, banking 
sector in Croatia 
1. Introduction 
The concept of corporate governance in banking sector is relatively new, but it could be 
observed in the correlation with other business companies. However, corporate governance in 
banks, as specific financial intermediaries, has many differences in comparison to other 
business companies. One of the main differences is in large number of stakeholders with 
different interests. The main stakeholders are shareholders, managers, employers and the 
state, and there are also specific stakeholders as depositors and debt holders [15]. Importance 
of corporate governance in banking sector is significant, because of the fact that poor 
corporate governance in that specific sector can damage stability of whole national financial 
system [3]. Banks represent one of the most important segments of any national economy, so 
it is important that banks provide qualitative, transparent, efficient and good corporate 
governance practice [12]. 
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Effective corporate governance in banking sector is a key element of the Basel Core 
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. From 1999 until now, the Basel Committee1 
published several papers where some of the elements of corporate governance in banking 
sector were emphasised. Some of those important elements for corporate governance are: a 
well-articulated corporate strategy; the clear list of responsibilities and decision-making 
authorities, beginning with individuals to the board of directors; senior management and the 
auditors; appropriate information flows internally and to the public, etc. [5] 
2. Corporate governance in Croatian banking sector 
The corporate governance in Croatia has its backgrounds in the periods of privatization and 
institution building [13]. The Croatian financial system is the bank-based Continental system. 
Banking sector is one of the largest industries in Croatia, so it is important that corporate 
governance has a significant role in creating investor confidence and efficient market. Almost 
all investment funds, pension funds and leasing companies were also owned by banks, whose 
total assets have exceeded USD 49 billion [13].  
At the beginning of 90-ties Croatian economy was transitioned from state owned to 
capitalist and this transformation make a big influence on banking sector. During the period 
of 20 years, a lot of domestic banks also became foreign banks. During the same period, 
banking sector in Croatia has shown merging and acquisition trends, and some banks were 
going through the process of bankruptcy. In early 90-ties the number of banks was always 
around 50 to 60, and at the end of the year 2010, there were 32 banks in Croatia [9]. Future 
predictions involve further acquisition and merging processes, especially among small and 
medium sized banks. The Croatian banking sector is highly concentrated; the five large 
banking group (Zagreba?ka banka, Privredna banka, Erste & Steiermaerkische banka, 
Raiffeisenbank Austrija, Societe Generale-Splitska banka) control for around 75 percent of 
the total assets in the industry [9]. Golja et al. [7] report that by the first half of 2010, 82.2% 
of the total bank assets still belonged to the group of large banks, and that more than half of 
total number of banks were under domestic ownership, and that majority of total asset of all 
banks were under foreign ownership.  
Effective bank and other credit institutions governance, is crucial to maintain public 
confidence in the banking system and the overall financial sector [8]. HNB in the same 
document states that “adequate corporate governance in banks include a clear organizational 
structure with well defined powers and responsibilities, effective procedures of identifying, 
measurement, monitoring of risks and reporting of risks which is or might be bank exposed, 
adequate internal control mechanisms that include reasonable administrative and accounting 
procedures, strategies and procedures for ongoing assessment and review of the amount, 
composition and distribution of internal capital needed to cover current and future risks, 
compliance with the general requirements of transparency dictated by investors, clients, 
agencies to assess the ratings, supervisors and other market participants, obligations and 
responsibilities to shareholders, employees and other stakeholders, secure and stable business 
and operations in accordance with laws and regulations” [8]. 
3. Aim of the study and the literature review 
This analysis was made on the secondary data regarding the Croatian bank ownership 
structure, ownership concentration and ownership type. At the end of 2010, there were 32 
banks in Croatia. It must be noted that authors observed ten biggest owners from the available 
data at Central Depository & Clearing Company. Also, authors made a categorization 
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1
 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision provides a forum for regular cooperation on banking supervisory 
matters. 
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according to the nature of all owners in a few categories: (1) domestic and foreign owners, (2) 
financial institution and non financial institution owners and individual investors (private 
person), (3) domestic bank owners and foreign bank owners, (4) domestic company owners 
and foreign company owners and (5) domestic private person and foreign private person. 
The main research questions are: Is ownership structure and type of owners connected 
with the bank performance indicators? Who controls the Croatian banks? The questions in 
this research paper are based on the fact that structure and type of ownership affects 
performance as an important element of corporate governance. For that reason, the objective 
of this paper is to examine the relationship between ownership structure, concentration, 
ownership type, and bank performance.  
There are numerous studies from all parts of the world examining ownership structure 
and performance in the banking industry. Auvray and Brossard in their research [4] observed 
77 European banks in the period of 8 years. They investigated the impact of banks’ ownership 
concentration on the effectiveness of shareholders’ market discipline. They conclude that the 
level of more than 20% ownership concentration is necessary to correctly transmit one 
shareholders’ monitoring into the distance-to-default indicator. Kern in his research [10] on 
UK banks reported that the major corporate governance challenge banks principal – agents’ 
problem when bank management is not aligned with banks owners. This can result with 
different operating performance which is connected with different risk preferences of 
management and owners. In their research on the random sample of community banks in 
Midwest, Spong and Sullivan [14] find out that ownership structures impacts the operating 
performance of the bank. Banks that have good ownership structures allocate capital more 
efficiently. Arun and Turner in their research paper [2] based their opinion on the theoretical 
discussion of corporate governance in banks in developing economies. Among a few of their 
suggestions, they think that foreign banks may have a positive impact on banking system 
stability and efficiency. Love and Rachinsky made a research [11] on 107 banks in Russia and 
50 banks in Ukraine in the period from 2003 to 2006. They discovered that corporate 
governance has at best a second-order effect on operating performance in both countries, and 
that banks with more concentrated ownership have lower rankings on corporate governance.   
4. Research methodology and study results 
This study focuses on 32 banks in Croatia at the end of 2010. The empirical analysis 
has been carried out on ownership data and bank performance indicators collected from 
Central Depository & Clearing Company (Cro. SKDD) and Croatian national bank reports 
(Cro. HNB). Data used in calculations and presentation is publicly available and disclosed on 
the Internet sites. 
4.1. Corporate governance, ownership and bank performance 
From 2006 till 2008 there were 33 banks in Croatia. But during the year 2008 and 2009 
the two savings banks entered into the Croatia banking sector. One as a result of the process 
of transformation from the savings and loan association into a savings bank, and other is a 
newly established savings bank. By the end of the first 6 months in the 2010 there were 34 
operating banks in Croatia: six major banks, three medium-sized banks and 25 small banks. 
Almost all banks in Croatia are in private ownership. Only one bank is in state’s majority. 
That is “Hrvatska poštanska banka” (Engl. Croatian Postal Bank). Within this paper authors 
consider 32 banks at the end of 2010 excluding two savings banks.  
Croatian national bank states in its research the following ownership structure of 
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in % 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
         
State owned banks* 78,4 41,9 43,1 45,6 5,7 5,0 4,0 
Private domestic banks 20,7 54,1 50,3 14,5 10,2 5,6 5,8 
Foreign owned banks 1,0 4,0 6,7 39,9 84,1 89,3 90,2 
 
in % 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 3.tr.10 Q3/10 
          
State owned banks* 3,4 3,1 3,4 4,2 4,7 4,4 4,2 4,3 
Private domestic banks 5,6 5,6 5,3 5,0 4,9 4,9 5,0 5,4 
Foreign owned banks 91,0 91,3 91,3 90,8 90,4 90,6 90,9 90,4 
Table 1: Ownership structure of Croatian banks  
(Source: http://www.hnb.hr/publikac/epublikac.htm ) 
Table 1 suggests that the bank privatization in Croatia has drastically reduced the 
number of state owned banks, and in compliance with that, increased the number of foreign 
owned banks.  
Through the research analysis the authors introduced several variables: Ow1, Ow2 ... and 
Owall10. Variable Ow1 represents percent of ownership average share held by the largest 
shareholders of 32 banks operating in Croatia. Variable Ow2 represents percent of average 
ownership share held by the second largest shareholders of 32 banks operating in Croatia, etc. 
Variable Owall10 represents percent of average ownership share held by the largest top ten 
shareholders of 32 banks operating in Croatia. The research analysis showed that first owner 
in average controls about 62.83% (Ow1) of bank shares, and the second owner controls in 
average 9.57% (Ow2). Gap between average percent of shares held by the first and the second 
owner is more than 50%. We can conclude that first owner in average controls more than 60% 
of bank shares. The total average ownership of the top ten largest owners of the 32 banks 
operating in Croatia is 89% (Owall10). The detailed analysis can be seen in the Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1: Average concentration of top ten largest owners of 32 banks share in Croatia  
(Source:  authors’ calculation from the data available at the Central Depository & Clearing 
Company website (Cro. SKDD) at the end of 2010) 
Having in mind the Croatian Law on takeover of joint stock companies [6], the authors 
can conclude that concentration of ownership in Croatian banks is very high, because the first 
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owner in average has more than 62% of banks share. Also, authors made several 
categorization of the bank owners’ type.  
Through the first categorization we distinguished domestic and foreign owners. Our 
research showed that domestic top ten owners control 62% share of banks operating in 
Croatia, and foreign top ten owners control 38% share of banks operating in Croatia. 
According to these results we can conclude that the majority of bank share is controlled by 
Croatian owners. Through the second categorization of bank owner type we distinguish 
financial institution owners, non financial institution owners and private person owners. 




Figure 2: Average ownership structure share of the financial institutions, nonfinancial 
institutions and private person 
The ratio of ownership structure for total average ownership looking the first top ten 
owners consists of 43% shares under financial institutions ownership, 30% of shares under 
non-financial institutions ownership and 27% of share under private person ownership. If we 
analyse the finical institution ownership structure we can notice that more than half of top ten 
largest bank share owners are under control of the foreign financial institution. This means 
that foreign financial institution have greater influence on banking sector than domestic 
financial institution.  
Majority of the bank shares, 74.79% of top ten largest financial owner shares, are 
controlled by bank institution. Other shares are under control of pension funds (0.53%), 
investment funds (12.37%), investment (0.25%) and insurance companies (12.06%). 
Domestic banks control 28% of bank shares owned by financial institutions, and 72% of bank 
shares owned by financial institutions are under control of foreign banks. This indicates that 
foreign banks have major influence on bank operation in Croatia. Non-financial institutions 
occupy 30% of the ownership structure of banks among the top ten largest owners of bank 
share. With further analysis of the nonfinancial institutions ownership structure we found that 
75% of non-financial owners were domestic company owners and 25% were foreign company 
owners. From this we can conclude that most non-financial institution owners are in majority 
domestic. 
Our research results showed that even five banks in Croatia are under 100% foreign 
ownership by the first owner (four banks are under foreign bank ownership and one bank is 
under nonfinancial foreign ownership). Two banks are under 100% domestic bank ownership 
by the first owner, 7 banks operating in Croatia are under foreign ownership by the first top 
ten owners and even 13 banks operating in Croatia are under domestic ownership by the first 
top ten owners.   
If we correlate results of concentration index of assets share with ownership structure 
of four largest banks in Croatia, we can conclude that largest banks in Croatia are under 
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highly concentrated foreign ownership, and they had in average 65% of share of assets in total 
bank assets in 2010. Although the majority of bank share is controlled by Croatian owners, 
the largest banks are under foreign owners and they have in average more than 60% of share 
of assets in total bank assets. 
5.  Correlation between bank ownership structure and performance indicators 
In this section authors describe the main characteristics of the data used in this paper 
and  show correlation between bank ownership structure (domestic, foreign, state, private 
ownership) and standard bank performance indicators (average assets, total assets, average 
equity, profit, Return on Average Assets, Return on Average Equity). As suggested in the 
paper of Nigerian author Aburime [1], ownership structure is an important factor of the 
company’s health, so it is possible to use ownership structure for prediction of company’s 
profitability.    
Authors used JMP, a computer program for simple and complex statistical analyses, for 
correlation testing.  Pearson’s coefficient was used in the study, but because of the small 
sample, results could not be classified as very reliable. Spearman’s coefficient showed weaker 
relationships between certain variables and this represents ground for further research. 
 
Table 2: Summarized data concerning bank ownership structure and performance indicators 
 
Table 2 represents summarized data about bank ownership structure and bank 
performance indicators for time period 1998 – 2009. Data from the table is derived and joined 
together from publicly available reports of Croatian national bank (HNB), published on their 
Internet site www.hnb.hr.  
Table contains three different variable groups:  
 
a) Year of observation (1);  
b) Bank ownership structure (variables are presented in percentage (%) of the total ownership 
share): summarized state and private domestic ownerships (2), domestic state ownership (3), 































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
1998 93,34 43,09 50,25 6,67 98689,69 96,78 18035,19 -2723,02 -2902,86 -2,76 -16,10 
1999 60,10 45,60 14,50 39,90 98733,25 93,52 14966,23 727,03 714,63 0,74 4,77 
2000 15,90 5,70 10,20 84,10 103401,78 111,84 12181,17 1429,40 1306,09 1,38 10,72 
2001 10,68 5,04 5,64 89,32 130132,99 148,43 13507,43 1228,77 894,17 0,94 6,62 
2002 9,84 4,01 5,83 90,16 161283,74 174,14 15102,52 2544,75 2074,75 1,58 13,74 
2003 8,97 3,37 5,60 91,03 189127,07 204,11 17333,06 3010,67 2506,69 1,59 14,46 
2004 8,71 3,07 5,64 91,29 216710,12 229,31 18919,55 3634,29 3036,84 1,68 16,05 
2005 8,68 3,37 5,31 91,32 244791,43 260,28 21563,13 4030,20 3247,80 1,65 15,06 
2006 9,20 4,21 4,99 90,80 282441,44 304,61 27351,90 4236,34 3394,81 1,50 12,41 
2007 9,60 4,70 4,89 90,40 324843,32 345,08 37216,99 5105,13 4067,44 1,57 10,93 
2008 9,37 4,45 4,92 90,63 357587,19 370,09 46550,35 5736,52 4612,48 1,60 9,91 
2009 9,11 4,16 4,95 90,89 374231,79 378,37 51250,55 4215,48 3277,68 1,13 6,40 
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c) Bank performance indicators: Average Assets presented in million HRK (6), Total Assets 
presented in billion HRK (7), Average Equity presented in million HRK (8), Profit or loss 
before taxes presented in million HRK (9), Profit or loss after taxes presented in million HRK 
(10), Return on Average Assets (ROAA) before taxes (11) and Return on Average Equity 
(ROAE) after taxes presented in percentage (12). 
 
Table 3 clearly reports that the year period from 1998 to 2000 is critical for the bank 
ownership structure, as foreign ownership share increased from 6,67% to 84,10%, leaving 
domestic private and state owners only with 15,90% ownership share. Later years indicate 
much less rapid fluctuations in the ownership shares, but it is clear that foreign ownership 
share remains dominant. It is important to note that the most of the above results are to be 
interpreted as averages. Also, the globalization of the banking industry in the 1990s has 
affected the banks performance indicators. 
Authors tried to find statistical correlation between ownership structure variables and two 
performance indicator variables (Return on Average Assets - ROAA and Return on Average 
Equity - ROAE), to see if there is a hint of connection between those two sets of variables. 
Analysis on the available data using statistical tool JMP and Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
shows that there is a significant correlation between the following variables: 
 
1) ROAA before taxes and Domestic state and private owned:  
correlation coefficient is -0,9107 with significant probability of <0,0001 (the 95% confidence 
interval is -0,98 to -0,71).  
Negative correlation coefficient suggests that higher values of domestic state and private 
owned bank ownership percentage mean lesser ROAA values and vice versa. Significant 
probability of <0,0001 means that there is a less then 0,01% probability that the correlation 
happened by a pure chance and more then a 99,99% probability that this correlation is 
genuine and relevant. In the literature dealing with statistical significance these results could 
be interpreted as “highly significant”. However, sample size must also be taken into 
consideration when dealing with data analysis; it is possible that the twelve year period (and 
consequently sample size 12) could not be sufficient for relevant hypothesis testing. 
Confidence interval suggests that there is a 95% probability that the correlation coefficient of 
the entire population resides between values -0,98 and -0,71. 
These interpretations can be applied to following results of the correlations between 
variables. 
2) ROAE after taxes and Domestic state and private owned: correlation coefficient is -
0,8935 with significant probability of <0,0001 (the 95% confidence interval is -0,97 to -0,66) 
3) ROAA before taxes and Domestic Private owned: correlation coefficient is -0,98 with 
significant probability of <0,0001 (the 95% confidence interval is -0,99 to -0,93) 
4) ROAE after taxes and Domestic Private owned: correlation coefficient is -0,93 with 
significant probability of <0,0001 (the 95% confidence interval is -0,98 to -0,76) 
5) ROAA before taxes and Foreign owned: correlation coefficient is -0,91 with 
significant probability of <0,0001 (the 95% confidence interval is -0,71 to -0,98) 
6) ROAE after taxes and Foreign owned: correlation coefficient is -0,89 with significant 
probability of <0,0001 (the 95% confidence interval is -0,66 to -0,97) 
 
As no more than 12 year period (1998-2009) is available for statistical analysis, it is 
difficult to generalize these results for more precise hypothesis testing. Also, data on which 
the analysis was performed is derived average data from all the banks in the observed years, 
so potential influential factors that could have influence all the banks in this period and bias 
calculated results are not identified and made into consideration in these correlation values. 
Nevertheless, it is apparent that certain statistical relationship exists between these two sets of 
variables which should not be discarded and ignored and that needs to be further investigated. 
For more detailed examination into these relationships we recommend further analysis with 
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more than 12 years time period and ideally measuring correlations between variables for 
individual banks, thus presenting more records (greater sample size) for more substantial 
analysis. Unfortunately, data for any former year period is not available at this moment. 
One more thing to consider is results for correlations between variables Domestic state 
owned and ROAA/ROAE: 
 
7) ROAE before taxes and Domestic state owned: correlation coefficient is -0,77 with 
significant probability of 0,0032 (the 95% confidence interval is -0,93 to -0,36) 
8) ROAA after taxes and Domestic state owned: correlation coefficient -0,76 with 
significant probability of 0,0041 (the 95% confidence interval is -0,93 to -0,33) 
 
Correlation coefficient for (7) and (8) could be represented as significant, but greater 
significant probabilities and far greater confidence intervals mitigate relationships between 
those variables and suggest that these correlations could have emerged by pure chance.  
It seems that there is a weaker statistical correlation between Domestic state ownership 
and ROAA/ROAE performance indicators then between Domestic private ownership and 
ROAA/ROAE performance indicators, which “boost” statistical correlation between overall 
domestic ownership and performance indicators. These findings would need further 
investigation on the bank specific level, which could identify significant influential factors 
which are not encompassed by this paper. 
6. Conclusion and implications for further research 
It is impossible nowadays to lead a successful bank institution, as well as to have a 
successful national economy, without effective corporate governance and analysis in the 
fields of ownership and performance. This paper, as an empirical analysis, examines the 
structure of bank ownership and its impact on selected performance indicators. During the 
observed period authors followed transformation from state owned to foreign owned banks. 
The research analysis showed that first owner in average controls about 62.83% (Ow1) of 
bank shares which is relatively high by definition. It is interesting to point out that the ratio of 
ownership structure for total average ownership of the first top ten owners consists of 43% 
shares under financial institutions ownership, mostly by bank institutions and pension funds. 
Looking at overall results, authors could conclude that certain statistical relationship exists 
between these two sets of variables and that there is a space for further research. The main 
research question - that bank ownership structure is related to bank performance - is discussed 
in detail. Based on the research results we can conclude that ownership structure as one of the 
main dimensions of corporate governance is correlated with bank performance. Measures of 
performance tend to show statistically significant correlation with bank’s ownership structure. 
Within the scope of this paper authors did not examined the influence of other corporate 
governance factors (innovation rate, market share, time to market, relationship between 
stakeholders, employees’ and customers’ satisfaction on bank performance etc.). The 
correlation and comparison between other factors (external and internal) and bank 
performance in Croatia should be examined in further research. 
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